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LEGITIMACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND 
LEVERAGE: THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF 
 INSOLVENCY ARCHITECTURE IN THE 
DECADE PAST AND THE DECADE AHEAD* 
Terence C. Halliday** 
 participate in this conference as a thorn among roses. Since I am a 
social scientist, and more precisely, a sociologist of law, my concern 
is less with doctrine and more with institutions. I shall be asking: How 
did the advances of the past ten years come about? What are the precon-
ditions for “maintaining the momentum,” as Ian Fletcher puts it?1 And, 
not least, what are the conditions under which the writing of norms or 
design of insolvency systems will actually be implemented? The ultimate 
test of all this diligent construction of an insolvency architecture comes 
at the moment of practice. In the classic terminology of sociolegal schol-
arship, under what conditions will “law-on-the-books” become “law-in-
action?”2 
Today I shall sketch the outlines of a theory of institutional develop-
ment. This draws in part upon my book, Globalization, Law and Mar-
kets, which I am currently completing with economic sociologist, Bruce 
Carruthers. In this case the institution is the framework or set of institu-
tional configurations I shall call the global insolvency architecture. By 
“development” I refer to the process by which disparate, scattered, and 
ad hoc efforts become integrated into a coherent framework of institu-
tional cooperation that purports to provide a comprehensive set of norms 
for governing national and cross-national bankruptcy. 
I shall develop my argument through four steps. First, I shall look back 
over the past decade and argue that the development of the insolvency 
field that we celebrate at this conference can be understood through a 
political logic of bringing into alignment three elements of an effective 
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 1. Ian F. Fletcher, Maintaining the Momentum: The Continuing Quest for Global 
Standards and Principles to Govern Cross-Border Insolvency, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 767 
(2007). 
 2. See generally RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCE (1986). See also JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERAC-
TIONS, AND CHANGE 11 (2001). 
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architecture: legitimacy, technology, and leverage. Second, I shall look 
forward and point to challenges that the advance of the international 
bankruptcy field will confront as it seems to build upon the solid founda-
tion already in place. Third, I bring us back to the ultimate test: the like-
lihood that even the most elegant and seamless of norms and structures 
will be effective in practice. I shall pose this as the enduring problem of 
the implementation gap. Finally, I shall raise some questions about the 
variability of bankruptcy regimes as they confront varieties of capitalism. 
These observations derive from a research program I have been under-
taking for a number of years. It has three elements: (1) a quantitative, 
cross-sectional, and time-series analysis of all bankruptcy reforms from 
1973 to 1998; (2) an intensive study of bankruptcy initiatives by interna-
tional organizations; and (3) three case studies of bankruptcy reforms in 
China, Indonesia, and Korea since the Asian Financial Crisis.3 
I. THE PAST TEN YEARS: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGITIMATION 
AND POWER 
In 1995 there was no comprehensive, coherent global set of standards 
for national bankruptcy regimes. As we turned the millennium in 2000 at 
least four potentially competing sets of standards were in the public do-
main—the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor 
Rights Systems (Principles),4 the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) 
Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures,5 the Asian Development 
Bank’s (ADB) standards,6 and the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development’s (EBRD) surveys7—with others pending. By 2005 
these four had essentially been unified in a single global standard repre-
sented by the integration of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
                                                                                                             
 3. See Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Negotiating Globalization: 
Global Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency Regimes, 31 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 521 (2006); Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Re-
cursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of 
Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007) [hereinafter Halliday & 
Carruthers, Recursivity of Law]. 
 4. World Bank, Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems (rev. 
2005), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_icr.html. 
 5. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Orderly and Effective Insolvency Proce-
dures: Key Issues (1999), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly/ 
index.htm. 
 6. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, at 10–85 (Apr. 2000), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/ 
Law_ADB/lpr_2000_1.pdf. 
 7. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Transition Report 
1999: Ten Years of Transition (1999). 
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tional Trade Law’s (UNCITRAL) Legislative Guide on Insolvency (Leg-
islative Guide or Guide)8 with the World Bank Principles. How was it 
possible for the world’s disparate bankruptcy specialists, competing na-
tion-states, and sometimes contending international organizations to get 
from the inchoate state of 1995 to the global consensus of 2005? That 
question can be answered at many levels. Let me offer a sociological 
perspective.  
The propagation of an effective global standard by an international or-
ganization requires three elements. The organization and its product must 
be seen as legitimate. The organization must select or create a technology 
that is fitted to the task. And the legitimate technology must be dissemi-
nated with a leverage appropriate for implementation. We interpret the 
movement towards a single global standard in the bankruptcy area as a 
series of trial and error steps towards normative models that combined 
legitimacy, technology, and leverage. Let me explain. 
A. Legitimacy 
If the purpose of global actors is to facilitate the adoption of global 
norms by nation-states, then they must be seen as legitimate.9 It is clear 
that most international organizations (IOs) most of the time either do not 
wish to rely on force or coercion or do not have the capacity to do so. If 
the objects of action by international organizations can be persuaded of 
the rightness of prescribed action, then compliance is more likely and 
implementation more probable. 
                                                                                                             
 8. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Legisla-
tive Guide on Insolvency (rev. 2005), available at www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ 
insolven/05-80722_Ebook.pdf.. 
 9. See generally Bruce Cronin & Ian Hurd, Introduction to THE UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE INSTITUTION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY ch. 1 (Bruce 
Cronin & Ian Hurd eds., forthcoming) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law) [hereinafter Cronin & Hurd, Introduction]; Ian Hurd, Legitimacy, in ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PRINCETONIENSIS: THE PRINCETON ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SELF-DETERMINATION (Wolfgang F. 
Danspeckgruber ed., forthcoming) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Internarional 
Law); STIJN SMISMANS, LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE: FUNCTIONAL 
PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL REGULATION (2004); Ian Hurd, Legitimacy, Power, and the 
Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 35 (2002) [hereinafter 
Hurd, Legitimacy, Power]; Elizabeth Heger Boyle & John W; Meyer, Modern Law as a 
Secularized and Global Model: Implications for the Sociology of Law, 49 SOZIALE WELT 
213 (1998). 
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Scholars of international organizations identify three such mandates.10 
First, IOs are more legitimate when their membership and decision-
making comprises representatives of the entities that are the objects of 
normmaking. This representative basis for legitimacy depends on the 
activation of criteria, which are quite diverse, for persuading prospective 
audiences that future products of an organization have been formulated 
by actors that share their interests or attributes. Second, IOs are seen to 
be more legitimate when their internal decision-making proceeds by 
standards of procedural fairness. All actors incorporated into the delib-
erative process in principle should be aware of the rules of deliberation 
and be treated fairly in their application. Third, in a kind of circular rea-
soning, IOs are more legitimate when they are seen to be effective. If an 
IO has previously shown itself to be successful in achieving its goals, in 
production of standards and in their adoption, then the IO is more likely 
to be considered legitimate in prospective endeavors. 
International organizations engage in a kind of internal calculus—they 
weigh their legitimation warrants against legitimation deficits. Each 
global actor either has, or may be able to construct, elements of legiti-
macy that nation-states, and other audiences, will accept as legitimate. 
These legitimation warrants variously include expertise, representative-
ness, or prestige. Legitimation warrants adhere not only to attributes of 
organizations or their deliberative processes. As Susan Block-Lieb and I 
have argued,11 a powerful legitimation warrant can be internal to global 
templates or scripts. Global scripts, such as UNCITRAL’s Legislative 
Guide, may vindicate themselves by a rhetoric that impels acceptance by 
its readers. In this sense IOs employ the scripts to legitimate rhetorically 
their claim for approval and adoption. They must frame the rhetoric of 
norms to appeal simultaneously to diverse, and often dissenting, con-
stituencies. 
But alongside these potential legitimation warrants exist legitimation 
deficits. Either by virtue of their goals, or their reputations, or their rela-
                                                                                                             
 10. The most compelling and theoretically incisive work can be found in IAN HURD, 
AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
(2007); Cronin & Hurd, Introduction, supra note 9; Ian Hurd, Breaking and Making 
Norms: American Revisionism and Crises of Legitimacy, 44 INT’L POL. 194 (2007), 
available at faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/breaking%20making. 
pdf; Hurd, Legitimacy, Power, supra note 9; Ian Hurd, Security Council Expansion and 
Institutional Legitimacy: Five Hypotheses in Search of a Test, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
(forthcoming 2008) (manuscript available at http://faculty.wcas. 
northwestern.edu/~ihu355/Home_files/final%20manuscript.doc). 
 11. See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Legitimacy and Global Lawmaking 
(Fordham University School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 952492, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952492. 
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tionship with delegitimating actors, or disreputable past practices, or 
their offensive ideologies, or incapacity, among others, international or-
ganizations carry delegitimating attributes that disqualify them or dimin-
ish their capacity to exercise influence. 
As a result, a central dynamic of reaching a consensus around global 
norms turns on efforts by international organizations not only to balance 
their own legitimation warrants and deficits, but also to seek compensa-
tory alliances, coalitions, and cooperation with organizations that are per-
ceived as legitimate. 
B. Technologies 
For social scientists, a social technology is defined as a systematic so-
cial means of achieving a particular outcome. Technologies emerge from 
organizations and they are expressed in many ways—as codified stan-
dards, managerial protocols, regulatory regimes, or regularized practices. 
International organizations are production centers of technologies. Some 
they borrow. Others they invent. All are intended to encapsulate a set of 
understandings or agreements and to package them in a form that will be 
persuasive to potential audiences or constituencies. 
In international lawmaking we observe three aspects of technologies 
that make a difference in their form and function. First, technologies in 
law vary by how binding they are. In the terminology of legal scholar-
ship, are they products of hard law or soft law?12 In UNCITRAL’s case, 
for instance, it has a repertoire of technologies that range from those 
closer to the hard law end of a continuum, such as conventions, to those 
that are progressively softer, such as model laws or legislative guides. In 
the insolvency field we have protocols, model laws from professional 
associations, principles and best practice, and guidelines, among others. 
In the drafting of norms for national bankruptcy systems all the products 
have leaned to the soft rather than hard law end of the continuum in part 
because consensus on transnational hard law would have been impossi-
ble. 
Second, legal technologies in global normmaking vary by their level of 
generality or specificity. A lively debate exists among scholars over the 
relative merits of technologies that produce standards versus those that 
produce rules. At one end of a continuum lie scholars and norm-
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ance, 54 INT’L GOVERNANCE 421 (2000). 
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producers who resist national and global harmonization of law.13 At the 
other end of the continuum lie scholars who insist that the great diversity 
of fast-changing markets with huge economic stakes requires that global 
regulation be expressed through binding principles that may be imple-
mented by many varieties of non-binding rules.14 The choice can be 
highly consequential in practice. In the bankruptcy field, the World 
Bank, IMF, and ADB took the more abstract route. So, too, did INSOL 
in its “Statement of Principles” for out-of-court workouts.15 By contrast, 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide combines not only high-level goals and 
objectives but many recommendations that are quite precise.16 
Third, legal technologies vary in their relative weighting of diagnosis 
and prescription.17 All formulations of norms for national legal systems 
proceed on some kind of diagnosis. Sometimes that diagnosis is assumed 
and scarcely articulated (e.g., that a country lacks an independent judici-
ary). In other cases the diagnosis is systematically conducted and some-
times publicized in full or in part, as we see in the “Legal Transition” 
surveys of the EBRD18 or the ADB survey of eleven nations.19 Legal 
technologies more often, but not always, include a prescriptive element. 
The IMF, World Bank, ADB, and UNCITRAL technologies are pre-
cisely of this kind. The weighting of diagnosis and prescription vary sig-
nificantly across technologies. The EBRD instrument was all diagnosis 
and no prescription. The IMF “Blue Book” kept diagnosis implicit and 
was mostly prescriptive.20 
C. Leverage 
The capacity of IOs to influence nation-states and local actors depends 
on what kinds of leverage they can exercise (i.e., the mixture of mecha-
                                                                                                             
 13. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legisla-
tures 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995); Robert E. Scott, The Politics of Article 9, VA. L. 
REV. 1783 (1994). 
 14. See John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 
AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 47 (2002). 
 15. INSOL Int’l, Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor 
Workouts (2000), available at http://www.insol.org/pdf/Lenders.pdf. 
 16. See UNCITRAL, Legislative Guide on Insolvency, supra note 8; Block-Lieb & 
Halliday, supra note 11. 
 17. See Halliday & Carruthers, Recursivity of Law, supra note 3. 
 18. See EBRD, Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition, supra note 7. 
 19. See ADB, Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank, supra note 6, 
at 10–85. 
 20. See IMF, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues, supra note 5. 
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nisms and power).21 Social science scholarship on global business regu-
lation points to various forms of leverage.22 The most visible is economic 
coercion, notably through the use of conditionalities by international fi-
nancial institutions which demand legal changes in commercial law and 
institutions as a condition of financial assistance. More common is mod-
eling, when IOs offer nation-states model laws or model bankruptcy sys-
tems to which they may adapt their own institutions. Not infrequently, 
leverage proceeds through persuasion, when IOs and professionals in 
their circle host conferences, write articles, and give speeches in regional 
meetings about the merits of particular scripts or other national models 
that adhere to those scripts. Persuasion can be coupled with systems of 
reward or incentives; sometimes financial, as in foreign aid or technical 
assistance loans, and sometimes moral, when IOs suggest that a coun-
try’s reputation will be enhanced or diminished by its conformity to 
global standards. Occasionally reciprocity also appears, when one coun-
try is persuaded to take a course of action that conforms reciprocally with 
another; as when two neighbors who share strong trading relationships 
decide to implement a global norm that ensures their respective courts 
each treat the other symmetrically. Organizational isomorphism proposes 
that several processes are in play, such as coercion, imitation, and per-
suasion.23 In transnational relationships these must be specified and ex-
tended. 
International organizations have portfolios of leverage.24 The IMF has 
economic coercion and UNCITRAL does not. The United States may 
employ reciprocity whereas INSOL is reliant on persuasion. Moreover 
the type of leverage is situation-specific. Conditionality can only be used 
by the IMF and World Bank when countries need their funds. Reciproc-
ity only works when two countries have strong ties, commercial or oth-
erwise. The availability of instruments for leverage depends also the at-
tributes of nations, whether they want or are willing to accept the condi-
tions of donors. Not all forms of leverage are positive: the powerful eco-
nomic coercion available to the IMF and World Bank often generates a 
backlash. Persuasion by UNCITRAL may be friendly but not potent. 
                                                                                                             
 21. See generally Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 
ANN. REV. SOC. 447 (2006). 
 22. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION (2000). 
 23. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 
(1983). 
 24. See generally Halliday & Carruthers, Recursivity of Law, supra note 3. 
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Here then are three elements of global institution-building. The devel-
opment of the insolvency field—and by extension other global fields of 
law—proceeded in a process of trial and error, competition and negotia-
tion, among organizations as they searched for: (a) strong warrants of 
legitimacy; (b) a technology that looks likely to work; and (c) forms of 
leverage that will convert global standards into national laws, and ulti-
mately local practices. 
Look again at the development of the bankruptcy field in these terms. 
The EBRD’s legal transition survey, begun in the mid-1990s, was essen-
tially a diagnostic instrument constructed by a very small group of 
mostly in-house experts.25 It relied almost entirely on persuasion of na-
tion-states to take it seriously, something it did by ranking countries 
against each other and effectively shaming them into reforms. But it had 
several defects. Its legitimation warrants were limited—it relied almost 
entirely on a few technical experts and its authority was regional—to 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Its technology was primi-
tive and not at all defensible by social science standards. Moreover its 
technology was not accompanied by an articulated normative standard. 
Its leverage for enactment was potentially strong—through persuasion 
and even financial incentives. 
The ADB’s report of 1999 had relatively narrow legitimation warrants; 
it relied principally on ADB lawyers, a consultant, and various law firms 
in eleven countries.26 Moreover, it was restricted to only a part of the 
Asian region. Its good practice standards balanced diagnosis—what was 
right or wrong with a country—with prescription, i.e., the standards 
themselves. Its leverage was a combination of modeling; it set out a 
model of a “good” bankruptcy system and persuasion, i.e., encouraging 
or shaming countries to conform to this model. 
The IMF “Blue Book” of 1999 was developed by Legal Department 
lawyers in consultation with five distinguished international practitio-
ners.27 Compared to the ADB and EBRD it was stronger on its expert 
auspices but weak on any pretense of representiveness. Moreover, the 
IMF’s use of conditionality ensured that any norms it produced would be 
                                                                                                             
 25. See, e.g., Anita Ramasastry, What Local Lawyers Think: A Retrospective on the 
EBRD's Legal Indicator Surveys, in EBRD, LAW IN TRANSITION: TEN YEARS OF LEGAL 
TRANSITION, at 14 (Autumn 2002), available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/ 
legal/lit022.pdf; Anita Ramasastry, Stefka Slavova, & Lieve Vandenhoeck, EDRB Legal 
Indicator Survey: Assessing Insolvency Laws After Ten Years of Transition, in EDRB, 
LAW IN TRANSITION: SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE, at 34 (Spring 2002), available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/legal/lit021.pdf. 
 26. See ADB, Law and Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank, supra note 6. 
 27. See IMF, Orderly and Effective Insolvency Procedures: Key Issues, supra note 5. 
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greeted with resistance, manifest or latent, by many developing coun-
tries, a deficit the IMF legal staff fully understood. Its technology took 
the form of a prescriptive standard without any accompanying diagnostic 
instrument, although the IMF does undertake diagnoses of nation-states, 
either through Article IV reviews or “Reviews of Standards and Codes.” 
In neither case did it make public its diagnostic instruments. Its prescrip-
tive norms had the merit of offering alternatives to countries and not de-
manding that “one-size-fits-all.” The IMF had extraordinary leverage in 
financial crises, as we saw in Indonesia and Korea, where it compelled 
far-reaching reforms.28 It presented a model with variants in a form that 
might be persuasive, particularly to countries that might anticipate re-
quiring its funds at a later stage. But the IMF realized all too fully that its 
combination of legitimacy, technology, and leverage would not prevail 
as a global standard. 
The World Bank was rather more equivocal on this score. As with the 
IMF, its legitimacy rested heavily on expertise, not only pulling in a 
small group of experts, but in taking its Principles, through many itera-
tions, from one forum of specialists and government officials, in one af-
ter another region of the world. But to many observers, including key 
leaders of the global insolvency initiatives, its expert strength was ac-
companied by weakness on each of the three aspects of legitimacy. 
Moreover, it had significant legitimation deficits. These included a gen-
eralized resistance to the World Bank because of its use of coercive eco-
nomic leverage and a sense by many that it was unduly close to the 
United States, that it was, in a word, exporting U.S. approaches to bank-
ruptcy. Its technology—principles—seemed well suited to the diversity 
of potential adopting nations, but they were subject to criticism on a va-
riety of grounds. The World Bank also had accompanying diagnostic 
instruments, but it did not and does not make them public, although some 
of the results of its “Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes” 
(ROSCs) are posted publicly.29 
It was for all these reasons that some countries and some leaders of in-
ternational professional groups turned to UNCITRAL. It seemed to offer 
the optimal balance of legitimation, technology, and leverage. Its legiti-
macy was high on each of the three attributes of representativeness, pro-
cedural fairness, and effectiveness. It had a stock of technologies that 
could be adapted to whatever levels of hard or soft law, principles, or 
rules, seemed apposite. It could rely on leverage through modeling and 
                                                                                                             
 28. See Halliday & Carruthers, Recursivity of Law, supra note 3. 
 29. See World Bank, Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC), 
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc.html (last visited June 7, 2007). 
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persuasion. On these bases, all asserted at the outset of the Commission’s 
deliberations, and variously adapted during the Working Group’s delib-
erations, UNCITRAL produced its Legislative Guide. 
Yet UNCITRAL itself does not have quite the leverage nor technical 
resources of its less legitimate UN sisters—the IMF and World Bank. 
This would seem to work against enactment and implementation. But 
precisely at this point there may be a prospect of an alliance that will bal-
ance its legitimacy with the leverage of the International Financial Insti-
tutions (IFIs). From 2002 to 2005, friction occurred between the World 
Bank and UNCITRAL secretariat and many of its delegates. Rather than 
channeling its efforts through UNCITRAL, as had other international 
organizations, the Bank proceeded with what appeared to be a rival set of 
norms. Admittedly these were more expansive than UNCITRAL’s man-
date, including institutional aspects of insolvency systems not treated by 
UNCITRAL. But the rivalry over the substantive heart of the Legislative 
Guide and Principles respectively aggravated many leaders of the global 
reform movement. Even the U.S. Treasury and the U.S. State Depart-
ment fretted that rival standards would confuse adopting nations and im-
pede convergence. 
Through negotiations over the past two years an agreement has been 
reached. UNCITRAL would publish its Guide independently. The Bank 
would publicize its Principles, without its accompanying commentary. 
The two would be substantively reconciled in a document that would 
show where World Bank Principles coincided with UNCITRAL recom-
mendations. In practice, the Bank and IMF agreed on a diagnostic in-
strument—its insolvency ROSC—that was also reviewed by 
UNCITRAL. In theory, the Bank would use the Legislative Guide as a 
prescriptive backdrop to countries that were impelled or persuaded to 
reform their laws. 
By 2005, therefore, an inchoate and difficult field of practice had gone 
from global disorganization to convergence on a single set of global 
norms. This feat occurred because financial crises had pressed the inter-
national and professional communities to push towards an international 
financial architecture in which insolvency regimes were a constitutive 
element. The logic of this advance can be seen as a process of trial and 
error, experimentation and adaptation, to attain a standard promulgated 
by organizations that could optimize legitimacy, a suitable technology, 
and appropriate leverage. 
II. THE NEXT TEN YEARS: ELABORATING LEGAL TECHNOLOGIES 
In one sense, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide is a signal achieve-
ment because it obtained a global consensus from the world’s most le-
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gitimate transnational organization on a set of norms for national bank-
ruptcy systems. In another sense, the work has just begun. Let me raise 
several issues that will be critical in maintaining momentum over the 
next decade. 
A. Legitimacy 
In the final analysis, legitimacy is a subjective state. It signifies 
whether a particular audience believes in the “rightness” of an organiza-
tion or its actions. It depends upon constituencies accepting that certain 
norms are authoritative and should be recognized as such. In the case of 
the Legislative Guide, this would manifest itself in efforts by national 
lawmakers to review their laws against this new standard and to amend 
them accordingly. In the composition of its Commission and Working 
Group, its procedures, and its past successes, UNCITRAL has proceeded 
along a path that will increase the probability that the Guide will be 
greeted as authoritative by national lawmakers and professionals alike. 
But whether in fact that legitimacy will be recognized remains to be evi-
denced—and legitimacy alone will not suffice, as we shall see below 
when we consider implementation. Moreover it will remain unclear for 
some time whether UNCITRAL’s association with the IMF and World 
Bank will prove costly from the vantage point of developing nations. 
Legitimacy may become an issue in the efforts of the American Law 
Institute (ALI) and International Insolvency Institute (III) to generalize 
the cross-border facilities of NAFTA to the rest of the world.30 This pro-
ject has significant auspices. The ALI is an established and prestigious 
institution in U.S. law reform circles, and the III is a young but prestig-
ious organization of insolvency practitioners, scholars, and judges. ALI 
has a track record in producing normative instruments, some of which 
have been highly influential. The fact that these principles include the 
world’s most powerful economy and govern relations among three quite 
different countries may also add cachet. But to be accepted universally, 
the product of such an expert enterprise may also run into some of the 
very legitimation issues that bedeviled the precursors to UNCITRAL’s 
Legislative Guide. For instance, its close proximity to the United States 
may be a deficit, engendering instinctive resistance from countries that 
chafe at perceived U.S. efforts to make the world conform to its image. 
In part its legitimacy will depend on how well it can be shown—for 
Mexico and for Canada especially—that these principles have worked. I 
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am not yet aware of the evidence on this account. Moreover, ALI’s proc-
ess and products have been criticized by scholars of private legislatures, 
not least for its work on Article 9 of the UCC.31 
Yet counting against these reservations it may be that legitimacy’s 
elements play differently in courts than legislatures. In contrast to adop-
tion of global norms by a legislature, in which most divergent interests in 
a society can be brought into play, courts can proceed without such a 
democratic mandate and at a lower decibel level. Indeed an ALI/III part-
nership may be far more persuasive to courts than any other branch of 
government. Even so, courts are also political institutions, never entirely 
insulated from local politics, and very much part of local politics in de-
veloping countries. Courts also must be seen to be legitimate in their re-
spective contexts. Hence their discretion for adopting rules that affect 
local creditors and workers, state and community interests, national pres-
tige and political patronage, may not be so great in practice. 
B. Technology 
UNCITRAL’s Guide adopts a soft law instrument that combines sev-
eral levels of norms, ranging from high-level principles to statutory lan-
guage in many recommendations. By adopting the soft law approach in 
the highly flexible guide-format, UNCITRAL has been able to take on 
issues that previously were thought to be intractable. 
Furthermore, Susan Block-Lieb and I have shown that UNCITRAL’s 
secretariat adroitly manipulated the formal properties of the Guide to 
cope with wide diversity in the world’s legal systems.32 In its glossary 
the Guide does not identify with any particular legal system. In its com-
mentary the Guide frequently presents options that reflect some of the 
variations across insolvency regimes worldwide. And, when a global 
consensus was not possible, the Guide’s recommendations used combi-
nations of rule-types that constitute a hierarchy of generality or specific-
ity to lower or raise the threshold of recommendation in accordance with 
the degree of diversity to be managed. 
This combination of soft law and a repertoire of rule-types appears 
highly respectful of national sovereignty. It places before national legis-
latures the governing principles that animate the law as a whole; it pre-
sents alternatives among which legislators may choose; and in cases 
where legislatures choose to step outside the Guide, that choice is framed 
by reference points towards which legislators can consciously orient 
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 32. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 11. 
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themselves—for or against. Together these attributes of the Guide appear 
conducive to a favorable response by legislators. This certainly will not 
produce unification. But it may facilitate convergence. 
Two problematic features of the Guide remain. One is its lack of a di-
agnostic instrument. The advantage of a diagnostic instrument is plain: it 
can sharply display to policymakers and officials where and how the 
country does and does not conform to global standards. If coupled with a 
prescriptive standard, this provides an impetus for reform. UNCITRAL 
has compensated for this by linking the Guide to the World Bank’s 
ROSC. However, it is not yet clear whether the Bank has tightly coupled 
its ROSC to the Guide in such a way that deficiencies that appear in a 
country’s ROSC can then be remedied in relation to specific recommen-
dations or options in the Guide. This is both a technical matter as well as 
a matter of institutional will: will UNCITRAL and the Bank proceed as 
partners or in parallel? The theory of legitimacy and technology would 
predict that both institutions will be better off working together than if 
either institution defects from their agreement to cooperate. 
A second limitation of the Guide concerns what it leaves out.33 The 
largest gap concerns institutions. Of the six core features of a bankruptcy 
system—substantive law, procedural law, professions, courts, regulatory 
agencies, and out-of-court mechanisms—UNCITRAL treats the first 
three in detail but the last three scarcely at all. Yet all scholars of law-in-
action, not to mention practitioners, know that the most pristine law-on-
the-books amounts to nothing if institutions are not in place to put it into 
practice. In this the Bank provides a complementary treatment, particu-
larly of courts. However, at present the World Bank Principles on courts, 
regulatory agencies, and out-of-court mechanisms are at a fairly high 
level of generality—and with a thrust, it has been said by potential con-
sumers, to be too reminiscent of the United States. As an alternative, 
some scholars argue34 that benefits would accrue to the presentation of 
principles in terms of several operative alternative systems that exist in 
practice and would which be acceptable under the principles. The Guide 
does this in a number of cases—presenting several options and discuss-
ing their relative benefits, an approach also seen in the IMF Blue Book. 
This suggests that it is timely for a more considered treatment of courts, 
regulatory agencies, and out-of-court mechanisms with the finesse 
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 34. See Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
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UNCITRAL has used in its substantive and procedural provisions, a task 
that UNCITRAL cannot do itself. 
C. Leverage 
If UNCITRAL, the IMF, and the World Bank in fact do develop a co-
operative relationship, by working back and forth between the Guide and 
the ROSCs, then a gradient of leverage is possible for these global 
norms. At the soft end, the Guide and Principles offer a prescriptive 
model or standard that is available for consideration by national reform-
ers. In the middle of the gradient, technical assistance by international 
institutions provide an economic and expert incentive to implement the 
norms; and in emergency situations, such as a financial crisis, the IFIs 
have available economic levers to compel national lawmakers to take the 
global norms seriously. 
Braithwaite and Drahos maintain that global business regulation is fa-
cilitated when webs of expertise are mobilized through webs of influ-
ence.35 What webs are available to propagate these global norms? His-
torically UNCITRAL has suffered from an incapacity of resources. 
While it has produced a succession of global standards, it has not been 
given the resources to disseminate and help implement its products. To 
correct this problem, in the last two years the Secretariat has created a 
Technical Assistance section, led by the Senior Legal Officer who 
drafted the Guide, and added a staff lawyer to provide technical assis-
tance to countries that are appraising UNCITRAL products. Even so, 
resources available to the Secretariat remain far below what would be 
necessary for it to make a global impact. 
For this, UNCITRAL will need to rely on two interconnected webs of 
influence. A powerful alliance has already been forged between 
UNCITRAL and international professional associations. INSOL has been 
a close partner in the first two of UNCITRAL’s successful insolvency 
initiatives and it appears it will continue to play such a role in its third 
initiative now beginning on corporate groups and inter-court cooperation. 
The International Bar Association’s (IBA) delegates, and those of the 
American Bar Association (ABA), have been intimately involved in the 
drafting of the Guide and the International Insolvency Institute has main-
tained a close involvement with the Working Group. UNCITRAL’s im-
pact in substantial part will depend on how actively INSOL’s national 
affiliates and the IBA’s Committee J on Insolvency and Creditors’ 
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Rights36 energize their members to mobilize domestically on behalf of 
insolvency reforms. Will these organizations have the same capacity for 
collective action at the level of the nation-state as they have in global 
arenas? The answer is probably no. The global influence of these organi-
zations has been possible because a small number of delegates from each 
have committed themselves over several years to close cooperation with 
UNCITRAL’s Working Group and its informal expert groups. This has 
required no substantial problem of collective action since they appear to 
have acted pretty much autonomously, borrowing their organization’s 
prestige but operating independently of it. To mobilize domestically has 
greater demands of collective action, and requires a strong message to be 
conveyed within associations from their global normmakers to local pro-
spective lawmakers. Both are demanding and cannot be taken for 
granted. 
A more powerful web of influence is available through the World Bank 
and regional development banks. Both the World Bank and the EBRD 
have staffers dedicated to insolvency reforms. They provide diagnoses of 
insolvency systems, offer technical assistance, and develop further stan-
dards. They also have resources. The ADB was an early and major 
mover in the field of insolvency reforms and continues to lend advice to 
particular countries, as it recently has at the penultimate moment of 
China’s bankruptcy reforms. Yet the two regional banks were not active 
parties in the later development of the UNCITRAL Guide and it may be 
that they are less invested in the outcome. The Bank, we have seen, has 
had an equivocal attitude to the Guide. If, then, after all the effort of 
forging an apparent global consensus on a single standard, the regional 
development banks and the World Bank are lukewarm about urging the 
Guide on their member countries, then it risks sitting on the shelf. By 
contrast, the OECD, based in Paris, has had a continuing interest in in-
solvency since the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Through its Forums on 
Asian Insolvency Reforms, held each year for Asian countries, it has fea-
tured UNCITRAL and the Guide with increasing prominence, most no-
tably in its April 2006 conference in Beijing.37 Some nation-states are 
similarly mobilizing through their aid programs, most notably Australia. 
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We confront, therefore, two potential scenarios. In one, the flexible and 
legitimate technology embodied in the Legislative Guide gets leveraged 
through the persuasion, modeling, and even financial incentives of pro-
fessional associations, international financial institutions, and interna-
tional governance organizations. Legitimacy, technology, and leverage 
will conjointly and significantly raise the probability of national conver-
gence around UNCITRAL’s norms. In another scenario, the differing 
priorities of international financial institutions, and problems of mobili-
zation by professional associations, will lead to a dissipation of the effort 
that brought the Guide to fruition. It is a social science problem to ex-
plain why one path will be taken rather than another. It is a pragmatic 
problem to choose whether momentum will be maintained or will falter. 
There are two further issues that will be critical in determining the re-
form trajectory of the next decade. One concerns diagnostic capacities. 
The other concerns best practices. 
D. Diagnostics  
A great deal of law reform proceeds on the basis of diagnosis—of 
evaluations about what works and what doesn’t.38 In many respects, by 
the standards of social science scholarship, the quality of diagnosis by 
international organizations has not kept pace with the quality of global 
standards and norms. 
The reasons are not surprising. Few players in the international insol-
vency field have any training in social science research methodology. 
Insolvency reform organizations have had virtually no contact with the 
networks of social science specialists on law across the world. The re-
sults are what might be predicted: the quality of diagnosis too often is at 
a level comparable to the likely results if social scientists were to draft 
statutes. 
The problems are manifest. These include: lack of precise indicators 
for evaluation; sampling bias in who gets asked what; too few cases are 
held to be representative of substantial diversity; entire legal systems are 
arbitrarily assigned numbers that are statistically meaningless; and cross-
sectional and time-series comparisons are thereby highly suspect. 
Law Departments of IFIs do have the expertise and capacity to ap-
praise law-on-the-books. But the appraisal of law-in-action, or of prac-
tice more broadly, falls far short of this. Conventionally IFIs save costs 
by variously (a) asking one law or accounting firm with which they do 
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business to report on an entire country; (b) asking a single academic or 
professional to do likewise; (c) conducting ad hoc interviews with a few 
practitioners and elevating them to a national profile; or (d) engaging 
outside consultants to undertake (a) through (c) on their behalf. The main 
exception is the World Bank which conducts its ROSCs by spending one 
or two weeks of intensive interviewing in a country. 
Characteristically, IFIs seldom or never talk to debtors or small credi-
tors or any parties to bankruptcies away from the capital city of a devel-
oping country. 
Unless this weak hand of IOs is significantly strengthened, then the 
quality of technical assistance, reform advice, and adaptation by coun-
tries to global norms will suffer badly. 
E. The Fallacy of “Best Practices.” 
A persistent fallacy stalks the world of global law reform and business 
regulation. It is the notion that there are “best practices” that apply 
equally well in all situations. The implausibility of this concept becomes 
more obvious when IOs advocate “one-size-fits-all” formulations for 
countries worldwide. This is so nonsensical on its face that IFIs now rou-
tinely deny that they engage in this practice. Yet it is difficult to see the 
difference between “best practices” and “one-size-fits-all.” 
What is wrong with these concepts? Perhaps the point is best made 
with a metaphor. No self-respecting wine lover would ever admit to the 
proposition that pinot noir grapes will flourish equally well everywhere. 
If you plant pinot noir in Provence or upstate New York or Fiji you will 
get at best an inferior, and at worst, an impotable wine. There are only 
certain regions of the world where pinot noir flourishes—in Burgundy of 
course, in parts of California and Oregon, in some regions of New Zea-
land, but not others. Moreover, even in Burgundy, pinot noir in the bottle 
will reflect even minor differences in terrain, soils, and exposure to 
sunlight and wind—that is, the effects of terroir. In wine, as in law local, 
context makes a discernible difference—the vine, the winemaker, the 
soil, the climate, the caves, the barrels, the techniques of winemaking, 
transport, storage, and exposure to changes in temperature. It is nonsense 
to expect the universality of taste of a given grape, irrespective of these 
1,001 contexts of its growth and cultivation. 
Law, too, is implanted in 1,001 different soils: from within a legal cul-
ture or from outside it; in contexts where people respect law and those 
where they don’t; in places where law has long-regulated behavior and 
situations where it is a new basis of social regulation; in locations where 
it conflicts with other legal systems and those where it complements cur-
rent legal systems; in cultures where recourse to courts is acceptable and 
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those where it is shameful; in places where judges are inferior officials 
from families at the edge of ruling elites to places where judges are hon-
orable, high-status professionals; in political systems where it is laugh-
able to imagine that judges could restrain a powerful ruler to those where 
it is thought to be their very obligation; in social systems where law is 
expected to be just and those where it has never been so; in countries 
where lawmakers intend implementing reforms and those where they 
have no such intent; and in places where the machinery of government 
has the capacity to implement reforms and those where it does not. 
Exactly the same set of so-called global “best practices” implanted in 
these radically different situations will produce notably different out-
comes. This is so for at least two reasons—the dynamics of law reform in 
a given country and a failure to match insolvency systems with different 
forms of markets. 
I close by commenting briefly on each. 
III. THE IMPLEMENTATION GAP AND THE RECURSIVITY OF LAW 
The ultimate test of the form and content of global norms, such as in-
solvency standards, depends not only on domestic enactment but on local 
implementation and usage.39 This confronts all international agents of 
reform with the enduring problem of the implementation gap. Two sets 
of factors contribute to implementation gaps in the insolvency field. 
On the one hand, an implementation gap can be predicted from particu-
lar configurations of legitimacy, technology, and leverage exercised by 
international organizations. In cases where international financial institu-
tions use coercive powers to impose rigid global norms on a nation-state 
it can be expected that implementation will itself become an arena of 
resistance. Even in cases where a marked asymmetry of power occurs 
between global institutions and nation-states—for instance, a financially 
desperate nation-state in financial crisis urgently needs huge loans to 
forestall economic collapse—and they appear entirely vulnerable to for-
eign pressure, supposedly weak nations show surprising capacities to foil 
international organizations.40 While capital-deprived developing nations 
                                                                                                             
 39. On implementation issues in Asian insolvency reforms, see Terence C. Halliday, 
Fifth Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR), Lawmaking and Institution-Building in 
Asian Insolvency Reforms: Between Global Norms and National Circumstances, (Apr. 
2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/47/38184739.pdf; Terence C. Hal-
liday & Bruce Carruthers, Fourth Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform (FAIR), Institu-
tional Lessons from Insolvency Reforms in East Asia, (Nov. 2004), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/7/33935734.pdf. 
 40. Terence C. Halliday & Bruce Carruthers, Foiling the Hegemons: Limits to the 
Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes in Indonesia, Korea and China, in LAW 
2007] LEGITIMACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND LEVERAGE 1099 
may be compelled to reform their law-on-the-books, they can effectively 
retreat to ground where they have all the advantages, viz., implementa-
tion or putting law into practice. Through adroit combinations of delay, 
playing international organizations off against each other, nullifying os-
tensibly compliant provisions of statutes with obscure regulations, and 
ignoring the law, these and other weapons of the weak may quash in 
practice what weak nation-states could not resist in enactment. 
This is not only a matter of unwillingness to implement global norms. 
Ample research shows that a translation process occurs when global 
norms encounter local situations.41 The process of translation itself is 
mediated by professionals and officials with quite different capacities or 
willingness to capture the underlying principles or spirit of global norms 
and make them meaningful in another setting. In practice, of course, 
these intermediaries also face legitimacy problems because, to be effec-
tive, they must find ways to present something foreign as domestically 
acceptable. They are not always willing or able to do this. They also have 
an array of technologies available to them. Both implementation or resis-
tance can be effected by more or less creative ways of manipulating these 
technologies in a way that Campbell calls bricolage.42  
On the other hand, law reform in any country follows a recursive proc-
ess.43 The dynamics of recursivity in bankruptcy reforms reveal that sev-
eral mechanisms widen or narrow the implementation gap in domestic 
lawmaking. 
First, implementation often fails because the law itself is incomplete 
and indeterminate.44 Of course, law by its nature is indeterminate. But 
arguably its determinacy is more in question when new concepts, doc-
trines, and theories are being imported from foreign sources. Statutory 
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enactment of bankruptcy law itself may be written in ambiguous terms 
with gaps and inconsistencies. Depending on the sophistication of the 
judicial system and regulatory agencies, further cycles of reform may 
render meanings more precise or compound the ambiguity. For instance, 
China’s new Enterprise Bankruptcy Act, which becomes effective on 
June 1, 2007, has been drafted in a very open format which leaves many 
issues unresolved.45 In part this has occurred because political struggles 
behind the new law were not resolved definitively. Passage of the legisla-
tion could only occur if ambiguities and gaps remained. The task of re-
solving these now moves to “Interpretations” by the Supreme People’s 
Court and rulemaking by various agencies of the State Council. But these 
may multiply rather than reduce the meanings of the law.46 
This brings us to a second reason for failed implementation: contradic-
tions contained within the law. In attempts to implement global stan-
dards, domestic policymakers not infrequently build in concepts that are 
in tension with extant concepts, doctrines, and usages. These then con-
front domestic political struggles which are often handled by building in 
concessions to conflicting political actors without forging an effective 
consensus. Such a struggle has been occurring in China’s bankruptcy 
reforms, for instance, between those top leaders who favor a socialist 
market economy versus those who prefer a socialist market economy.47 
In the face of such ideological tensions, a vague law that incompletely 
reconciles foreign and domestic interests may be the only hope of legis-
lative enactment. But by pushing clarification of the ambiguities to com-
peting state agencies—financial regulators or regulators or state-owned 
enterprises—and courts, the struggle breaks out again, often with incon-
sistent results. 
Third, a mismatch of actors frequently occurs between those who make 
the law and those who are involved in practice. Creditors and profession-
als are usually heavily involved in lawmaking but debtors are not—and 
labor, too, is often missing in bankruptcy law reforms.48 If debtors are 
ignored, as they were by the IMF and World Bank in the Indonesian re-
forms, then they have all the more reason to resist in practice, as they 
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also effectively did in Indonesia.49 Talk of creditor rights by international 
organizations, without a commensurate respect for debtor rights, gets the 
parties to bankruptcies off on a bad footing. If international organizations 
care as much about law-in-practice as law-on-the-books, they will need 
to elicit the cooperation of all parties to bankruptcy proceedings, espe-
cially as some of those parties are powerful in local politics, not to men-
tion in practice. 
Fourth, implementation problems often occur because there are diag-
nostic struggles over the nature of the problems to be corrected by law 
reform. Each party to bankruptcy reforms—international financial insti-
tutions and ministries of justice, workers and managers, creditors and 
debtors, lawyers and judges—has views about what is wrong that needs 
fixing. I have already said a good deal about the importance of diagnosis. 
Suffice it here to say that it is not simply a technical matter of defensible 
evaluation. It is also a political matter. Every party in domestic politics 
has an interest in defining the bankruptcy problems in ways that their 
prescriptions are designed to remedy. Hence effective implementation 
requires some consensus among international organizations and domestic 
constituencies over the definition of problems and their relative priority. 
Frequently IFIs and nation-states disagree. Without agreement reforms 
are likely to be stillborn. 
IV. VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, VARIETIES OF LAW 
Let me conclude more by assertion than argument. For national bank-
ruptcy regimes, I have proposed that the concept of “best practices” is 
fallacious. It is extremely rare that a single practice in law will be best in 
all circumstances. This notion has no validity on its face and cross-
national research shows it has no prospect of implementation in practice. 
This same critique can be made for global norms more generally. The 
more rule-like those norms and the less flexible the alternatives they pro-
vide, the more probable it is that they will fail at the point of implemen-
tation. Square pegs cannot be forced into round holes. 
I believe it is time that international organizations take more seriously 
the scholarship of political economists and recognize that there are sev-
eral varieties of capitalism.50 They contrast a coordinative form of capi-
talism that is characteristic of most Continental countries with a liberal 
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form of capitalism that is exemplified by Britain and United States. Plau-
sibly this theory can be extended to other regions of the world where we 
will discover distinctive forms of market organization and distinctive 
configurations of governance over markets. Much of this variation will 
turn on the relative maturity of legal institutions in a nation-state and the 
historical primacy of law as a means of regulating social relationships. In 
several regions law has never been particularly salient, legal institutions 
have not been much respected, and lawyers and judges have not been 
considered prestigious occupations. Commercial transactions have been 
regulated in a variety of other ways. 
It may now be the case that increasing integration of global trade will 
demand more law-like ordering of commercial relationships. Many de-
veloping countries now recognize that they must at least provide the ap-
pearance of legalism in their frameworks for commercial transactions. 
But the extent to which legal certainty is required for expansion of trade 
is by no means empirically established. In fact there are glaring examples 
in East Asia to the contrary, China not the least amongst these.51 
A more sophisticated way forward, I propose, is to develop a contin-
gent set of relationships between types of markets and types of insol-
vency systems. Put another way, it is now time for scholars and interna-
tional agencies to begin developing a theory of the conditions under 
which certain kinds of bankruptcy systems will best fit certain kinds of 
markets. If we can identify family resemblances of states and markets, 
then we can also identify clusters of insolvency systems.52 The task then 
is to match particular types of insolvency systems with the markets to 
which they are best adapted. This is no easy matter. That is one reason 
why it has not already happened. Such a matching would require careful 
attention to the affinities of legitimacy, technologies, and leverage in 
global and local arenas. But as we push forward into the next decade I 
propose that such a refinement of our collective enterprise represents not 
only an exciting intellectual frontier but a pragmatic necessity. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 51. See John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the 
Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND 
SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons ed., 2003); Tom Ginsburg, Does Law Matter for 
Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV.829 (2000). 
 52. By an insolvency system I refer to the bundle of law and institutions that include: 
(1) substantive bankruptcy law; (2) procedural bankruptcy law; (3) bankruptcy courts; (4) 
out-of-court mechanisms; (5) bankruptcy professions; and (6) government bankruptcy 
agencies. 
